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Altruism has been defined as “costly acts that confer economic benefits on other 
individuals.”1 Since people may be more or less altruistic in a given situation, this 
definition implies that someone who willingly incurs a greater cost in order to confer a 
fixed economic benefit on another person or group is more altruistic than one, in the same 
situation, who is willing to incur only a lesser cost for the same economic benefit to 
another person or group. Altruism, understood in this way, has been measured by 
presenting people with a series of hypothetical choices between a fixed amount of money 
(usually $75) for other people at varying social distances, and a usually lesser amount for 
themselves; the amount of money for themselves equal in value to $75 for the other 
person (the “crossover point”) measures altruistic tendency or “generosity.”2, 3 Here we 
show not only that relatives tend to be placed at closer social distances than non-relatives 
but also that, at the same social distance, people are willing to forgo significantly more 
money for the benefit of relatives than for the benefit of non-relatives. Altruistic behavior 
thus depends on both social distance to, and degree of relatedness to, the object of that 
behavior. 
In prior experiments, crossover points were obtained for people at various social 
distances from the participant. Social distance was defined as numerical order in 
closeness, to the participant, of person-N (N = 1 being the closest, N = 2 being the second 
closest, and so forth). The crossover point represents the maximum amount of money a 
participant was willing to forgo (the “cost”) in order to give $75 (“the economic benefit”) 
to person-N. 
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METHOD: Participants (206 Stony Brook University undergraduates) were first 
asked to imagine that they had made a list of 100 people ranging from their closest friend 
or relative at N =1 to (possibly) a distant acquaintance at N =100 (but not to actually 
make the list). At each N-value participants made a series of choices between descending 
or ascending amounts of money for themselves and $75 for person-N. The crossover 
point was the monetary amount for themselves at which their preference changed 
(“crossed over”) from a descending amount for themselves to $75 for person-N or from 
$75 for person-N to an ascending amount for themselves. Crossover points were obtained 
for each participant at 7 N-values (N = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100) presented in random order. 
 Prior to choosing, participants were asked to think of a specific person at each N-
value tested. After each crossover point was obtained,  participants filled out a 
questionnaire asking for person-N’s relationship to them (mother, father sister, brother, 
boyfriend, girlfriend, neighbor, roommate, etc.), how many years they had known person-
N, and other demographic information about person-N.  
--------------------------------------- 
Inset Figure 1 here 
--------------------------------------- 
 RESULTS: The solid circles in Figure 1 are overall median crossover points. The 
greater N was, the less money participants were generally willing to forgo at the 
crossover point. That is, altruism was discounted by social distance (Rachlin, 2006). 
Equation 1, a hyperbolic discount function (of the same form as delay and probability 
discount functions)4, 5 provided moderately good fits to individual-participant crossover 
points (mean R2 = .811), and an excellent fit to the median crossover points (R2 = .997):  
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where V = the undiscounted reward value; v = the crossover point; ksocial = a constant that 
varied across individuals. Because, as is typical in social discounting procedures, many 
participants preferred $75 for others at N = 1 or N = 2 to $75 for themselves, V was not 
fixed at $75 but was allowed to vary along with ksocial. For the median data, V = $87.2. 
The greater was a person’s ksocial, the steeper her discount function, the less altruistic she 
was.  
 Taking a cross-section at each N-value, crossover points for relatives (coefficient 
of relationship r ranging from .5 for parents and full siblings to .03125 for second 
cousins) were separated from crossover points for non-relatives (defined as those with r < 
.03125)6. As expected, there were much higher percentages of relatives at low than at 
high N-values. The percent of relatives placed at N = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100, was 72, 
79, 50, 39, 28, 17, and 5 respectively.  
 The open squares and triangles in Figure 1 are medians, at each N-value, of the 
crossover points for relatives and non-relatives separately. The upper dashed line is the fit 
of Equation 1 to the medians for relatives (R2 = .925; ksocial = .034; V = 82); the lower 
dashed line is the fit of Equation 1 to the medians for non-relatives (R2 = .982; ksocial = 
.083; V = 84). The crossover points for relatives are significantly higher than those for 
non-relatives. In an independent t-test (t(1004) = 14.319, p = .000). 
 From Figure 1 alone, it is not possible to say that any given participant was 
willing to give more money to relatives than to non-relatives. It is conceivable that 
participants who put more relatives on their lists were just more generous overall than 
those who put fewer relatives on their lists. To test whether higher generosity towards 
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relatives than non-relatives holds within individuals, we determined, for each participant 
at each N-value, the signed (+ or -) deviation from the mean crossover point at that N-
value. Then, for each participant, we averaged the deviations for relatives separately from 
the deviations for non-relatives. (Across participants, the average deviation from the 
mean for relatives was +0.365 and for non-relatives was -0.144 as expected on the basis 
of Figure 1.) Then, again for each participant individually, we subtracted average 
deviation for non-relatives from that for non-relatives. (The data of participants who cited 
only relatives or only non-relatives at all N-values were ignored.) Let us call this the 
“deviation difference.” A positive deviation difference for any individual indicates that 
that individual’s crossover points were generally higher for relatives than for non-
relatives. Across, participants the average deviation difference was +0.471, significantly 
above zero [t(191) = 3.249, p = .001] showing that individuals were more generous 
toward relatives than non-relatives. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
--------------------------------------- 
 Among relatives, participants tended to give more money to closer than to more 
distant ones. Figure 2 shows the fraction of $75 that was forgone so as to give $75 to a 
relative as a function of  the coefficient of relatedness to that person (irrespective of 
social distance). Note that the slope of the function overall is greater than 1 (dashed line 
at slope = 1) and that participants preferred $75 for their closest relations (r = .5) to 
amounts greater than $75 for themselves (point above the dotted line) even though they 
presumably could have taken the higher amount, given $75 to their parent or sibling, and 
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kept the difference. Perhaps this economically irrational stated preference was merely a 
way of differentiating their very closest relatives, those to whom the bonds of obligation 
were strongest, from the rest. 
 DISCUSSION: The fact that people are more generous to their relatives than to 
non-relatives is not surprising, but the fact that, even after social distance has been taken 
into account, they are more generous to their relatives than to their non-relatives, is 
somewhat surprising. Of two people at the same social distance, one a relative and the 
other a non-relative, participants were willing to forgo less money for the benefit of the 
latter. This finding implies that there are factors other than social distance that determine 
altruistic behavior. We can only speculate what those factors may be. One possibility is 
that social distance itself is multiply determined. You might feel close to a friend because 
he or she is an entertaining person and fun to be with, but still not be willing to give him 
money. You might feel indebted to a relative. Or, a relative, even one you might not like 
much, may be more likely to reciprocate your altruism than a friend would be, even at the 
same social distance. But this possibility complicates the definition of altruism with 
which we started: “…costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals.” 
When the “costly acts” are actually investments from which a return is expected, they are 
less costly than their nominal amounts and, to that degree, less altruistic. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
1. Social discount functions separated for relatives and non-relatives. The upper and 
lower dashed lines are Equation 1 fit to median crossover points for relatives (open 
squares) and non-relatives (open triangles).  The solid line is Equation 1 fit to overall 
median crossover points (solid circles). The error bars are standard errors of the mean for 
the overall crossover points.  
 
2. Median fraction of $75 participants were willing to forgo so as to give a relative $75 as 
a function of their coefficient of relatedness. The dashed line is the locus of equality. The 
error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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